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Abstract
This thesis is a descriptive and interpretive study into the political economy of intellectual
property rights, the conceptual and practical implications for the phenomenon of global
governance, and how developing countries experience problems with the implementation
of national policies that infringe on international intellectual property rights. The specific
area of interest is the generic medicine debate that ensued in South Africa after the
alleged violation of patent rights of anti-HIV/Aids drugs by the Department of Health.
The research question that is addressed is to what extent has the existing international
intellectual property rights regime been influenced and/or undermined by South Africa's
intended application of WTO regulations in terms of compulsory licensing and parallel
imports of "essential" medicines. In doing so, the paper examines the roles of the
important states, international organisations, institutions, and private sector firms within
the sphere ofthe political economy of intellectual property and how they impede upon or
improve the functioning of the intellectual property rights regime.
The methodology entails analytical inquiries into documentary evidence on the nature of
the international intellectual property rights regime. Areas that are examined are the
agendas of the important actors, namely states and their respective departments;
individuals and firms; and international organisations. The concept of intellectual
property is examined to determine its dynamic role within the generic medicine debate.
The thesis concludes that the agendas of pharmaceutical firms and states are exploiting
current political stalemates in the negotiations for a fair intellectual property rights
regime. National health agencies, and specifically the South African Department of
Health, are under enormous pressure to provide affordable health services. Specifically,
the US Government and US pharmaceutical firms are dominating discussions on the
architecture of the international intellectual property law regime. By using an analysis
incorporating systemic, domestic interest, institutional, and ideational perspectives, it is
argued that South Africa's drive for a more distributive intellectual property rights regime
has placed the issue of health, Aids and generic medicine firmly within the sphere of the
political economy of trade agreements.
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Opsomming
Hierdie tesis is 'n deskriptiewe en 'n interpretiewe studie oor die politieke ekonomie van
intellektuele eiendomsregte, die konseptuele en praktiese implikasies vir die verskynsel
van globale regering, en hoe ontwikkelende lande probleme ervaar met die
implimentering van nasionale beleid wat internasionale intellektuele eiendomsregte
aantas. Die spesifieke area van belang is die generiese medisyne debat wat onstaan het na
die beweerde skending van patentregte van anti-HIVNigs medisyne deur die
Departement van Gesondheid.
Die navorsingsvraag wat beantwoord word behels die omvang van die impak van Suid-
Afrika se voorgenome toepassing van WTO bepalinge, met betrekking tot die verpligte
lisensiering en parallelle invoer van "essensiele" medisyne, op die bestaande
internasionale intellektuele eiedomsreg regime. Hierdie tesis ondersoek vervolgens die
rol van state, internasionale organisasies, instellings, en privaat sector firmas binne die
sfeer van die politieke ekonomie van intellektuele eiendom en hoe hulle afsonderlik die
funksionaliteit van die intellektuele eiendomsregte regime beïnvloed.
Die metodologie behels 'n analitiese ondersoek van die literatuur oor die aard van
internasionale intellektuele eiendomsreg regimes. Areas wat ondersoek word, is die
agendas van belangrike akteurs, naamlik die staat en sy onderskeie departemente;
individue en firmas; asook internasionale organisasies en instellings. Die konsep van
intellektuele eiendom word ondersoek om die dinamiese uitwerking daarvan op die
generiese medisyne debat te verstaan.
Hierdie tesis voer aan dat die agendas van firmas, spesifiek farmaseutiese firmas en state
die huidige politieke dooiepunt in die onderhandeling rondom 'n regverdige intellektuele
iendomsregte-regime, uitbuit. Nasionale instellings, soos die Suid-Afrikaanse
Departement van Gesondheid, is onder groot druk om bekostigbare gesondheidsdienste te
lewer. Die VSA en farmaseutiese firmas domineer onderhandelinge vir 'n nuwe struktuur
vir die internasionale eiendomsregte-regime. Deur gebruik te maak van 'n analitiese
raamwerk wat sistemiese, interne belange, institusionele, en ideologies perspektiewe
inkorporeer, word daar geargumenteer dat Suid-Afrika se pogings om 'n meer
distributiewe intellektuele eiendomsregte regime te verseker, die probleem van
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gesondheid, Vigs, en generiese medisyne binnne die sfeer van die politieke ekonomie van
handelsooreenkomste, plaas.
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CHAPTER ONE:
AlM, SCOPE AND METHOD
1.1 Background and problem statement
The growing scale and importance of the trade in intellectual property, highlights the
economic and political impacts of the information age. With knowledge being the new
hot commodity and with the power to shape values, welfare and the future, a whole new
perspective on issues such as global governance, cooperation, international political
economy, and health economics is necessary.
The issue of the violation of intellectual property rights (!PR's) affects those international
actors who have vested interests in the continuation of a strong protective intellectual
property regime. These violations are seen as "pirating" of intellectual property and
poses a threat for the "New Economy" as envisioned by the US neo-liberal trade agenda.
In an environment where competition is tough, this illegal competition is making it very
difficult for the industry or country to maintain its comparative advantage and market
share in for example the pharmaceutical industry (Coleman, 1997: 48-51). The pirate is
especially threatening in countries lacking proper !PR frameworks. Under such
conditions, there are few incentives for the transfer of intellectual property to legitimate
private sector industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, and for governments
enforcing the WTO !PR agreement.
The US Government was significantly pressured in the 1980s to gradually replace
antitrust laws with a regime for the protection of!PR's. This situation provided the
background for efforts by US policymakers to include the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) attached to the Uruguay round of GATT
in 1986 (Sell, 2000: 175). This move laid out the path of future !PR disputes and
indicated how the US had a definitive agenda in setting up an!PR regime to protect the
very profitable US pharmaceutical industry. Hence, the US position within GATT was
simple: if all countries will harmonize their !PR laws with the US, then the US will not
impose trade sanctions on those countries. This resulted in a number of disputes during
the 1990s in response to this explicit statement on the rules of the game. China, Thailand
8
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and Taiwan were the first ones together with South African to challenge the US IPR
hegemony.
It seems that despites efforts to impose a free trade agenda, the control of the exchange in
intellectual goods will only come at the expense of aggressive laws. One can argue that a
major reason for the US position on the protection of its pharmaceutical patents (a
particular form of an IPR) is that only the US has the capacity and willpower to enforce
IRP laws internationally and thus securing the compliance of other countries. The other
side of the coin is that the US was enforcing its own unilateral economic agenda, via the
Bush-administration, on the international IPR regime. South Africa challenged this
agenda directly by questioning regulations pertaining to GATT and the WTO that allow
for the violation of patent rights, through its 1997 Medicines Act.
South Africa's legal exploitation of clauses in the WTO IPR agreement in terms of
compulsory licensing and parallel import of generic medicines when "essential", was
done in order to secure cheaper medicines for the treatment and curbing of the anti-
HIV/Aids epidemic. This move was done in accordance with international law and
according to the WTO's patent protection agreements within the TRIPS Agreement. The
pharmaceutical firms involved could not challenge the South African laws through the
dispute mechanism procedures of the WTO, as only member states can do that. These
firms could have taken the case with the South African Government to the World Health
Organisation (WHO), but the contentious issue of Aids would have made a ruling in
favour of the South African Government highly likely. The pharmaceutical firms
subsequently had to fall back on national negotiations with the state involved. These
negotiations did not prove to be fruitful, and the firms took the South African
Government to the country's own High Court. This could set a precedent for similar legal
moves of developing countries suffering from similar health service problems.
Using a holistic analytical framework, I firstly discuss the theoretical background to
contemporary political and economic trends in order to establish the conceptual
boundaries of the contemporary intellectual property right (IPR) regime. The role and
importance of the state, institutional, and private actors are analysed and evaluated. The
dynamic nature of intellectual property and the trade-offs between innovation and
efficiency within the political economy of intellectual property is also explained.
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In the second part I present detailed evidence on the debate surrounding South Africa's
violation ofWTO TRIPS regulations. The framework of Biersteker (1992) is used to
order the analysis into a world level, an institutional level, a domestic level, and
ideational level. In doing so, I highlight the different agendas of the actors, ranging from
the supra-national and institutional, the state level, to the individual private firm actors.
The world system level of analysis entails an examination of the international IPR regime.
The institutional level of analysis entails an examination of important institutions such as
the WTO, WHO, and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). The
domestic level of analysis focuses on the political economy of the Aids debate in South
Africa and it also includes a discussion of the pharmaceutical industry. The holistic
framework incorporates the ideational level of analysis throughout these discussions.
The last part of the paper summarises the conclusions of the research, as well as
recommendations for policy actions for South Africa.
1.2 Theoretical guidelines
The South African Government's IPR policies in terms of the violation of medicinal
patent rights were causing considerable consternation within the US pharmaceutical
industry. Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry's close political connections with
Capitol Hill is the leading cause of the US Government's economic threats and
diplomatic pressure that characterised South Africa's leading role in challenging WTO
regulations. To understand the nature of the politics regarding the international IPR
regime, it is necessary to understand the nature of the broader economic reforms being
pursued throughout the developing world. Biersteker (1992: 108) describes these
economic reforms as a reduction in and transformation of state economic intervention.
States increasingly rely on market mechanisms to substitute their service providing
functions. States thus increasingly support private sector actors, whether voluntary or
involuntary.
10
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There are various explanations that can be used to describe how the current economic and
especially the trade regime came to being. The prevailing neo-liberal approach is a
contemporary mainstream theoretical framework that can be used to analyse the processes
within the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO), i.e. the collection of rules,
regimes, and institutions that regulate international economic co-operation (Kegley &
Wittkopf, 1995: 35). Neo-liberalism gives meaning to a system where it is assumed that
states are rational actors that try to maximise welfare through free trade. Such a system is
anarchical, yet of an orderly nature. The structure of the world order is not an important
point of analysis, rather the analysis of processes and trends within the system towards
co-operation and harmonisation of policies is important.
Neo-liberalism assumes international co-operation and interdependence in terms of
international law, economic interests, and political conflicts, thereby assuring a
harmonious world order (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995: 32). Neo-liberalism incorporates
into its analysis the contribution of a variety of international and sub-national actors.
Importance is given to the growing number of economically and thus politically powerful
transnational actors, such as multi-national corporations (MNC's).
A specific strand of Neo-liberalism, namely Complex Interdependence goes even further
in analysing the agendas of other important actors, such as transnational banks and large
Research and Development (R&D) firms (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995: 33). Complex
Interdependence criticises the notion that states are the only important actors and that
national security and military issues dominate nation-states' decision-making agendas.
This analytical perspective explores issues that arise out of international economic
interdependence of which the IPR debate is an example.
However, the assumptions of the above-mentioned perspectives partly disqualify them as
an appropriate theoretical framework for the purpose of this thesis. The assumptions of
co-operation and harmonisation of economic policies do not hold true in many cases in
reality. States sometimes pursue goals that undermine international co-operation through
constant efforts to achieve competitive economic advantage (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995:
203). The result is that states, especially the rich ones, try to maintain and protect their
knowledge and human capital stock through advancing their agenda in international
organisations such as the WTO. These theoretical approaches thus do not prove to be
11
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useful in analysing the political economy of the international IPR regime. The politics of
IPR ask for a much more nuanced and fundamentally holistic perspective. Biersteker
(1992) argues for such a perspective and presents four separate explanations on political
economic reforms that he later integrates into a holistic explanation. They are systemic,
domestic interest, institutional, and ideational explanations.
In terms of a systemic level of analysis, the global economic trends have been strongly
determined by the globalisation of production, concerns for protectionism, and extremely
competitive economic competition (Biersteker, 1992: 112). Developing countries
generally have no option when faced with these trends in the last two decades; either they
participate or stand the chance of being marginalized. Even when they do join this "new"
international system, the lack of competitiveness and responsiveness causes most
economies not to share in all the benefits. The socialisation of developing countries
within this new competitive environment is described by Robert Cox as the
"internationalisation of the state" (1987: 253). He means with this "the global process
whereby national policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world
economy of international production".
Systemic explanations have their drawbacks in explaining the contemporary economic
trends, especially with regards to why change occurs and what the shifts in ideational
aspects are. Systemic explanations alone do not specify the original forces that caused
the economic changes. Additionally, systemic explanations seem to say that the
international economic policy convergence is part of a natural process, instead of
questioning whether it is only a temporary phenomenon (Biersteker, 1992: 114).
The domestic interest explanation goes somewhat further. This approach gives insights
on political behaviour, especially with regards to the breaking up and formation of new
coalitions. The emergence of new economic elites and their coalition with public sector
actors is the single most important factor for the influence and direction shifts in
economic policies.
Institutional explanations provide useful insights into the functions and influence of
international institutions such as the WTO. The WTO was and is instrumental in
outlining the international trade and production architecture. It is an example of how the
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global economic regime "enhanced" the role of an international institution and made it
representative of the established order (Biersteker, 1992: 116).
Ideational explanations provide useful insights in the leading role of the economic
hegemon in the world's political economy, namely the US. The revival ofNeo-Classical
economics and neo-liberal policy agendas of the US influenced to a large extent the
architecture of the current political economy (Biersteker, 1992: 119). It is especially the
way these ideas gained legitimacy through the various networks of multilateral
institutions and conventions that enabled it to become the dominant ideology. Ideational
explanations cannot however explain the content and basis of change in a vacuum, as
ideologies exist within a social and historical context. An integrated analysis is therefore
necessary.
Biersteker's integrated explanation focuses on the importance of the dynamics of the
current economic order. All the above-mentioned explanations have valuable analytical
contributions to make in assessing the performance of the economic order. Systemic
analysis provides the foundation for inquiries into the changes of economic policy,
especially in developing countries. This approach gives meaning to the advent of trends
such as the globalisation of production, the "increase in competitive pressures", and the
"exhaustion of prior economic policy models" (Biersteker, 1992: 125).
The ideational approach gives meaning to the importance of the introduction of neo-
classical ideas in trade as the global recession of the early 1980s forced new thinking on
growth policies. The institutional approach explains how these ideas were embedded
within international institutions, which were empowered to guard and implement policy
agreements. The domestic interests approach gives insights to the rise of particularly
strong private-to-private sector and private to public sector coalitions.
Using the explanatory framework of Biersteker in terms of the different components, one
can analyse the origins and nature of the generic medicine and AIDS debate in South
Africa in an eclectic and nuanced fashion. Firstly, policy convergence across the
spectrum of economic issues became a necessity for those countries that opted to
participate in the neo-liberal economic order. As South Africa transformed into a multi-
party democratic system, it had no choice but to join the order through its membership of
l3
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international financial, trade and political institutions. The ideational and practical
conditionalities embedded within these institutions ensured policy convergence.
Secondly, the neo-liberalorder has seen, at first, incredible growth in many regions in the
world since the early 1990s. Inmany ways the phenomenal growth has overshadowed
other developmental issues such as health, education, and other welfare services
provision. The Asian Crisis signalled a slowdown in world economic growth. The last
two years saw the US economy struggling to keep up its high growth figures. Suddenly,
the new-liberal order and its institutions are under scrutiny as the performance levels
drop. From a systemic perspective, the internationalisation of the state has exposed many
poor, developing states to the harshness of an extremely competitive international trade
and production regime. International collaboration and global governance is difficult
under such conditions, as there is growing disconsensus on the role and direction of the
current neo-liberal economic order.
South Africa finds itself within a league of other developing countries that are dissatisfied
with the declining importance of developmental issues in the neo-liberalorder: the classic
North-South debate. Although the South African government has pursued a neo-liberal
growth strategy since 1996 in the form of the GEAR, it has increasingly begun to face the
practical implications of its membership and affiliations with institutions of the global
economic order. South Africa signed the TRIPS agreement and pledged to uphold the
conditions of the treaty. Recently it found itself in a position where it must exercise one
of the clauses of the treaty in order to secure cheaper medicines for curbing AIDSIHIV.
The Government argued that it was merely exercising a clause of the WTO's TRIPS
Agreement that allowed for compulsory licensing and parallel import of "essential"
medicines. The relentless competition and attacks it faced from private sector interests,
namely the pharmaceutical industry, as well as governmental pressure, namely from the
US, is a case study that incorporates most issues of concern and disagreement in the new
economic order, i.e. health, trade, institutional, and inter-governmental politics.
The theoretical background discussed here raises serious questions about the fundamental
nature of international co-operation and multilateralism. How can multilateral agreement
bring supposedly economic optimal outcomes for a large part of the world's economies?
Sell (2000: 176) argues that the answer lies in the decisive "transnational private-sector
14
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
mobilisation of an OECD consensus", and the "collapse of developing countries'
opposition" to them. This answer relates to Susan Strange's framework of addressing
perceived power nuances in the global political economy. The question of "Who, or
what, is responsible for change?" and "Who or what exercises authority - the power to
alter outcomes and redefine options for others - in the world economy?" both relate to her
inquiry into the diffusion of state power and how global governance is increasingly the
terrain of multi-national public and private sector actors (Strange, 1996: 184).
In terms of Strange's framework, it becomes increasingly obvious that the benefits of the
existing international IPR regime serves mainly the vested interests of powerful private
sector firms and public sector institutions, keen on advocating neo-liberalism as the only
approach towards trade and technology. As South Africa is challenging this international
IPR regime, the analysis should extend towards examining the theoretical nature of the
political economy of intellectual property, as well as the de facto legal regime of those
private and public sector interests at stake.
The most important state actor within the international IPR regime is the US. When
examining the role of the US in the generic medicine debate, one has to see the larger
picture of the structure of the global political economic order to understand what the US
interests in this regime are. Although it is popular to refer to the US as the world's
hegemon in various fields, the term hegemon may be too narrow a description as it may
only include the characteristics attached to a "dominant" actor. I subscribe to Cox's
definition of "hegemony": " ... a structure of values and understandings about the nature of
order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities" (Cox, 1992: 140).
Cox in fact argues that what we are currently witnessing is the rise of a post-hegemonic
order (1992: 141). This assertion implicitly assumes a certain difficulty for the
construction of a new hegemony in the place of a declining one. This means that as the
societal and economic values of the US supposedly decline in its importance and
dominance, other "universals" will have a hard time to displace it.
Cox, fortunately, foresees stability as world actors find bases for common ground, such as
ecological stability. There will however be the danger of social polarisation as new
structures of production and vulnerabilities to competition create new sources of conflict.
I would argue that we have to take Cox very serious on this warning and this is one of the
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main premises of this paper. The current developmental and welfare goals of developing
countries are being undermined by the interests of the integrated and rich of the world;
not even Cox's "supra intersubjectivity" as a bridge between the separate subjectivities of
the "different coexisting traditions of civilisation" (1992: 142) would be probable in such
a world. With "supra intersubjectivity" Cox refers to a growing realisation across
different civilisations that a.common fate is shared. This growing connectedness is
visibly manifested in the ecological movements in many industrialised countries. The
growing realisation that the plight of the poor and sick, of which the Aids epidemic is a
prime example, is a universal phenomenon may prove to be powerful breeding grounds
for calls for a more distributive and equitable !PR regime.
Social polarisation between the different political subjectivities of the world can be easily
traced in contemporary society. The dividing lines are, rather obviously, between groups
that "became identified with and manipulated in the interest of economic and social
cleavages" and those that benefited form it. Those that benefit from contemporary
political economic arrangements are the US and the collective interests that it presents.
Opposition to globalisation thus comes from those who are disadvantaged and want to
determine their own political and economic goals.
A third theoretical framework which is useful to analyse the political economy of the
international!PR regime and South Africa's efforts to go ahead with its own!PR policies,
is that of the global public goods approach. The global public goods approach towards
intellectual property may provide significant insight into the motivations of South Africa
and similar developing countries to use it in alleviating specific health dilemmas, such as
the HW/Aids epidemic, through the production of generic medicines. Such an approach
may also prove to be useful in analysing the effects on the !PR regime. I will discuss the
background of such a connection, beginning with an analysis of public goods.
Public goods are recognized as having benefits that cannot easily be confined to a single
"buyer". However, once they are provided, many can enjoy them for free. A clean
environment and education are two examples. The substantial externalities that follow
from the use of the above-mentioned goods make them "public" goods. These
externalities are benefits in the case of public "goods", but they can be disadvantageous to
society in the case of public "bads", such as pollution.
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Traditionally, there have been three conceptions of public goods (Cerny, 2000: 453).
Regulatory public goods, which include the maintenance and protection of market
establishments, include such goods such as the protection of private and public property
rights. The second type entails activities of production that are controlled for and
provided by the state, such as public works programmes and public financing. They are
called productive or distributive goods. Finally, there are redistributive public goods.
They refer to goods that arise when states respond to the "political and public policy
demands of emerging social classes" (Cerny, 2000: 454). Redistributive public goods
normally refer to welfare and health services and environmental protection.
While public goods are understood to have large externalities and many benefits, a stricter
definition relies on a judgement of how the good is consumed. If no one can be barred
from consuming the good, then it is non-excludable. If many without becoming depleted
can consume it, then it is non-rival in consumption. Pure public goods, which are rare,
have both these attributes. Impure public goods possess them to a lesser degree, or
possess a combination of them (Kual et al, 1999).
Cerny (2000:456) argues that globalisation means that especially states have difficulty in
providing redistributive public goods. By implication this means that health services are
(again) underprovided as access to pharmaceutical technological stock is inadequate.
In terms of the Aids debate, the issue is whether the technologies produced by the
pharmaceutical firms are strictly private goods or whether it can adhere to some of the
characteristics of a global public good. Fieldhouse (2001: 174) argues that technology,
rather than capital, is the main contribution that MNC's can and have made in developing
countries. The problem, however, in practice is that firms strive inherently to obtain a
"monopoly rent" in their respective industries, thus making competition imperfect (2001:
176). Together with pharmaceutical firms' motive of maximising profit, this
characteristic results in the pricing of pharmaceutical products that are out of reach of
developing country governments.
The term "global public goods" arises out of the realisation that with globalisation, the
externalities are increasingly borne by people in developing countries. Issues that have
17
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traditionally been merely national are now global because they are beyond the grasp of
any single nation. They now reach across borders, generations and population groups.
The distinction between public goods and global public goods is therefore not only
geographical. There is a multi-dimensionality included that incorporates the sociological,
economic and temporal dimensions (Kual, Grunberg & Stem, 1999: 12). Global public
goods refer mostly to those systems and structures that arise when global co-operation
takes place in terms of the environment, the economy, the social system, and other
dimensions.
It is the conceptual existence of generational global public goods that makes the public
goods approach applicable to the debate of intellectual property and patent rights.
Generational global public goods provide benefits within and among various generations
or to a specific generation that live at a given time (Sandler, 1999: 20). These benefits
can be non-rival and non-excludable and are subsequently called pure goods. An example
is the prevention of air pollution. An impure global public good lacks either the
characteristic of non-rivalry or non-excludability. An example is the protection of the
world's forests. More relevantly, such an impure global public good could be ajust and
distributive !PR regime with the existence of effective authority. The benefits of spill
over effects which generational global public goods provide are an important base for
increased international co-operation and incentives to produce these goods.
In the broad sense, impure global public goods tend towards possessing the characteristics
of "universality". This means that they benefit more than one country or people or socio-
economic group. At the same time, impure public goods do not discriminate against any
population segment or set of generations. This, at the moment, cannot be said of the !PR
regime as it is an economic oriented sphere and not a social oriented one.
Kual, Grunberg & Stem (1999:4) identify another characteristic of impure global public
goods, namely that they are "final" and "intermediate" global goods. These public goods
might in the classical sense be called "inherent goods", such as peace, and "instrumental
goods", such as an international regime that ensures that peace is maintained.
A redistributive global public-goods-approach can bring developing nations the prospect
of a more equitable allocation of global resources to address priorities that matter to them.
Such an approach would however necessitate a notion of distributive justice, which refers
18
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to the drive to reconcile national "demands for social justice with global peace and
security" (Kapstein, 1999: 88). The notion of distributive justice is exactly, Ibelieve, the
premise for South Africa's violation ofIPR and patent rights by exercising WTO
regulations. Such a project is underway and has been for decades in many developing
countries, but as this thesis points out, it clashes with established private and public
interests of rich industrialised countries.
A practical aspect of distributive justice, besides the manufacturing of generic medicines,
could entail substantial infrastructural investments from pharmaceutical firms in the
health systems of developing countries (Stiglitz, 1999:316). These investments can take
the form of technical assistance in the production of generic medicine and medical
assistance with the administering of anti-Aids medicines.
Before the redistributive project can be realised, there must first be international
consensus on objective criteria for defining a global public good. The implication for
distributive justice and redistributive global public goods should also be established.
Another important factor that is lacking in the redistributive approach from developing
countries is a common international authority that has to step in to create incentives for
the creation of such global public goods.
Another important dimension of the drive for a more equitable distribution of global
public goods involves civil society. Orr (1987: 21) notes that civil society provides the
necessary understanding and campaigning to force private sector actors to fall in behind a
redistributive drive:
"Currently, consumer critics, international public interest organizations, and
grassroots activist offer the greatest hope for protection of people's health against
the pharmaceutical industry's aggressive pursuit of healthy profits."
Itwas very noticeable in the case of South Africa how the public outcry, NGO's and
media attention overall mounted enormous pressure on US policymakers and the
pharmaceutical industry to reduce their hard-line approach towards IPR's and health
Issues.
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Arrighi et al (1989: 74) also note that the capitalist mode of production, i.e. the
fundamental nature of the pharmaceutical industry, is effectively questioned by civil
society:
"... popular movements join forces across borders (and continents) to have their
respective state officials abrogate those relations of the interstate system through
which the pressure is conveyed."
Civil society is as strong as any force in the international political economy. It is largely
responsible for the political achievements in the South African case. The pressure applied
by relentless public attention necessarily shifts the priorities of the actors involved.
In the case of South Africa, civil society proved effective in convincing the US
Government to ease its relentless political pressure regarding piracy and the !PR regime.
Subsequently, former President Clinton announced that the TRIPS agreement of the
Uruguay round would not be pursued within the framework of the WTO against countries
who manufactured generic substitutes or parallel-imported essential medicines.
1.3 A Political Economy of Intellectual Property
1.3.1 Introduction
The integration of international actors' activities, especially trade integration brought
along by the forces of economic liberalisation, gave rise to problems with regards to how
these actors handle the issue of intellectual property and its accompanying rights. These
actors, whether they are states, firms or NGO's, each have important claims as to how the
trade liberalisation should shape the conditions and future of intellectual property. These
processes of demand and supply and the agendas of the different global actors in terms of
intellectual property, describe the political economy of intellectual property.
Intellectual property refers to "know-how." "Know-how" refers to knowing how to do
things, for example how to organize a construction project. Employees hold know-how.
Generally know-how is protected by contract legally binding an employee to secrecy.
When a corporation or government finds its secrets have been betrayed, it is possible in
most countries to take the matter to the courts. Sometimes, for example when a senior
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executive of General Motors moved to Volkswagen, it may not be possible to insure the
secrecy.
IPR's concerning know-how and trade secrets are imperative for the continuation oflP
trade in particular and the workings of the global economy in general. Firms and
individuals therefore have to have the ability to legally enforce these rights and protect it
from piracy through enforced IPR's.
Patent, trademarks, and trade secrets are the major classifications of copyrights that are
protected by IPR's throughout the world. On the one hand, copyrights protect the rights
of authors of literary and artistic works, such as books and other writings for a minimum
period of 50 years after the death of the author.
On the other hand, copyrights also protect industrial property. Industrial property can
usefully be divided into two main areas. Firstly, industrial property is characterised with
the area of the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks. Trademarks
distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.
Geographical indications, which identify a good as originating in a place where a given
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin, are also
included in the definition of distinctive signs.
The other area of industrial property is that which is protected primarily to stimulate
innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall inventions
(protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets. The protection is usually
given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents).
IPR concepts are essentially North American and European legal concepts. As a general
rule, to get protection for lP, the inventor, author, or entity must go through the legal
process of the country where she seeks protection for her property.
The exception to the general rule occurs when a country has signed an international
agreement with respect to IPR's where rights are granted to citizens of the signing
countries. Gikkas (1996: 15) notes that there are many multilateral and bilateral
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agreements signed in the world regarding intellectual property. These will be discussed in
the chapter concerning the international !PR regime.
The potential financial as well as economic benefits of trade in intellectual property is a
function of the extent of the protection of!PR's. For hundreds of years, the basic theory
of intellectual property has existed based upon the assumption that creation is facilitated
by the provision of a temporary monopoly, which ensures that the inventor alone will
benefit from the profits (Gikkas, 1996). The Lockean concept ofland property was used
to justify the extension of proprietary rights in intellectual property. The metaphor of a
land estate has facilitated the notion of the ownership of ideas.
Formal !PR's such as copyrights, patents, registered industrial designs and trademarks,
are justified to protect creativity or give incentive to further creativity. Without these
rights, others could use !P freely. In return, society expects creators to make their work
available and that a market will be created in which such work can be bought and sold,
i.e. the process of commodification that is discussed in the theory section. Society wants
to encourage creativity but in order to prevent deficiencies; it does not want harmful
monopolisation of market power. The state therefore builds in legal limitations to the
rights granted to the creator. Such limitations include both time and space. Universally,
!PR's are granted for a fixed period of time and it protects only the product or creation in
a material form, such as a written contract.
As the concept of the ownership of ideas was accepted, a specific theory of intellectual
property was gradually formed. In the abstract sense, intellectual property is knowledge
that is protected by some intellectual property law in such a way that it is possible to keep
it a secret. It can simply refer to knowledge that is hidden. This means that intellectual
property is a property that is intangible and indivisible (Gikkas, 1996: 3). It also implies
that an unlimited number of users can consume it without depleting it. The fact that
information is intangible means that, in the absence of property rights, the producer of
information will find it difficult to sell the information in the marketplace to recover any
investment made. This causes a dilemma for the way we comprehend intellectual
property as a commodity.
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The dilemma basically entails a tension between two perspectives. The first perspective
emphasises the need for the incentive to produce, thus intellectual property is seen as a
private good. The other perspective emphasises the need to prevent monopolies; there
must be a free flow of information. Each one has its merits and it embodies the main
camps within the political economy of intellectual property. The balance between these
two perspectives is very fragile. As former World Bank: economist Joseph Stiglitz (1999:
312) argues, the process of technological growth is under a constant threat of stagnation
because of governments' appropriation of intellectual property, such as patents, for use in
their own public sector programmes. Countries stand to lose out through irresponsible
appropriation, as the producers of life-saving medicines, namely the pharmaceutical
firms, lose the incentive to invest capital in R&D.
However, Stiglitz (1999: 312) also highlights the economic deficiencies that arise when
pharmaceutical firms use their monopoly-like positions to inflate prices and profits of
pharmaceutical medicines. Coupled with the relative long duration of patents (on average
17 years), this means that medicines are under-produced. Countries that experience
health problems of crisis proportions such as the HIV/Aids epidemic also sometimes
abandon R&D on "essential" medicines because ofthe fear of appropriation of
intellectual property.
1.3.2 Intellectual property and globalisation
The political economy of intellectual property must be understood within the larger
context of globalisation. Nel (1997: 1-3) summarises the features of "globalisation" as a
"transnationalisation"; an "interconnectedness or interpretations of events, relations and
dimensions; and a "homogenisation of practices, norms, and values". It is important to
note that what happens in one context is exactly replicated in other contexts. As Nel puts
it, globalisation "does not transcend cleavages, but these cleavages are being reconstituted
by globalisation in ways which make them all the more difficult to identify." This
difficulty to identify subjective and contextual cleavages is exacerbated by conscious
efforts of obfuscation by those that benefit from transnationalism and interconnectedness,
and "those who find their marginalized position deteriorating exactly because of these
processes" (Nel, 1997: 3).
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Wealth creation in the global village is shifting from a resource to a knowledge base. The
economy is increasingly dependent on innovation to create, to sell, to explain and to solve
problems (Chartrand, 1995). The knowledge-based economy emphasises intellectual
property as the important commodity that is increasingly traded in the world's virtual
market places, such as the Internet. Intellectual property had to be commodified in order
to exploit it for capital gain. Etzkowitz & Webster (1995: 497) explain that while
knowledge per se is "evanescent and temporary" and has the qualities of a public good, it
had to be institutionalised and legalised within a special time frame. Only then does
intellectual property have the means to be patented and copyrighted.
Nel (1997: 20) clearly doubts whether globalisation and the latest life cycle of
commercialised knowledge will be conducive to the diffusion of "know-how to alleviate
problems such as ... diseases" to those end-users who need it most. Our knowledge-
driven economy is creating cleavages in the global society and it raises questions about
the capacity of international institutions to provide democratic control over life-saving
knowledge that is increasingly controlled and dictated by the "agenda-setting activities of
transnational epistemie communities" (NeI1997: 21). The pharmaceutical industry, like
many other knowledge intensive industries, is extending its reach and increasingly
qualifies as such a transnational epistemie community.
Due to its capabilities to convey information, technological advancement, know-how and
ultimately economic and political power, intellectual property can be regarded as the legal
form of the knowledge-based economy (Post, 1998). As this thesis will point out, there
are however different conceptions as to how intellectual property serves different global
actors' interests. This conflict of interests is a fundamental characteristic of the
international !PR regime. Although there is an international political framework for the
analysis of intellectual property within the institutions of the !PR regime, there is also
amongst these institutions disconsensus on the role and direction of how intellectual
property should be put to use. South Africa's challenge of the current!PR regime is a
prime example of the diversity of views present in the international arena.
Despite the political disconsensus, the information age is moving relentlessly forward,
facilitating highly innovative and competitive firms who can somehow manage to acquire
comparative advantage. Governments, being the other main actor, routinely attempt to
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modify trade laws for intellectual property according to unilateral agendas. These
dynamic interactions between state and private sector actors characterise the globalisation
process of intellectual property. In order to understand the dynamics of intellectual
property globalisation and its effects on the South African situation, I next move on to
describe the nature of the international !PR regime.
25
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER TWO:
THE INTELLCTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME
2.1 Introduction
The international !PR regime refers to those institutionalised procedures and rules for the
cóllective management of global !PR policy problems (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995: 14).
Krasner's (1982) conceptualisation of "regime" provides useful insights into the
dynamics of the international !PR regime:
"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs or fact, causation, and rectitude.
Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are
prevailing practise for making and implementing collective choice." (1982: 186)
The main purpose of an !PR regime is to protect the technology and value embedded in
intellectual property. Secrecy of intellectual property is of the utmost importance to
maintain comparative advantage in terms of technology and know-how in the
international marketplace. Patents of certain sought after medicines, for example, are
sometimes far more valuable that all of a firm's capital stock or its money balance. These
patents should therefore be protected, from the perspective of the owner, in order for it to
continue to be of commercial use.
An !PR regime also entails that the owners of patent rights, i.e. pharmaceutical firms have
the ability to legally enforce these rights and protect them from piracy. There are,
however, different conceptions as to how such an !PR regime should function. In order to
analyse the impact of South Africa's actions on the international !PR regime, it is
necessary to comprehend the scope of and nature of the current regime.
The international !PR regime is firstly characterised by its capacity to govern issues
relating to intellectual property. Czempiel (1992: 250) defines governance as the
"capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be
done." Governments rely on rule of law to govern, coupled with the threat of force.
Governance relies only on the execution of power relations without the threat of force.
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The assertion therefore is that the international IPR system is one of global governance.
This is so because the scope of the globalisation of intellectual property issues that have
traditionally been only national are now global as they are beyond the scope of any single
nation's activities. The international IPR system is also a regime because it refers to
Krasner's "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" as illustrated by the
functioning ofthe GATT, WTO, the TRIPS Agreement, and WHO.
Secondly, the international IPR regime is also characterised by conflict. These conflicts,
such as the generic medicine debate, arise out the interaction between the different actors
and institutions. Czempiel (1992: 27) argues that these conflicts are part of the highly
complex systems of global governance as economic interdependence is growing in
importance. Although it is fairly easy to grasp that the world is not merely a world of
state actors, it is (not yet) a world society. It is rather a "societal" world where the
interests of a variety of societal actors are eminent. Czempiel states that a global
governance perspective prescribes the need to direct the system of governance "in such a
way that the most effective causes of ... unjust distribution of values, are being affected
and diminished" (1992: 270). In terms of the international IPR regime, Czempiel's view
provides some principles with which the IPR regime can be analysed.
2.2 A history of Intellectual Property Rights
Some countries' views in terms of IPR' s can be seen as protectionist and of only national
interest. Generally for a country importing intellectual property, IPR's are seen as
cumbersome as they hinder growth of technological stock. The exporters are however in
an advantaged situation. There exist varying degrees of technological stock protected by
IPR's in different countries. One therefore finds that the stage of industrialisation of a
country determines where the country will be on this ladder of varying degrees of
advantages.
Conceptions of intellectual property originated in the US and in Europe (Gikkas, 1996:2).
The US IPR regime has its origins in the notion that once a patent applicant has gone
through all the legal procedures, the state will provide full protection of this property, as
is the case with other private properties. An exception may occur when a state bilaterally
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or multilaterally is connected with an international agreement on IPR's. The TRIPS
Agreement, for example, has a clause that permits the compulsory licensing and parallel
import of "essential" medicines such as anti-retrovirals for the use in the fighting of
HIV/Aids. This clause allows (in theory) for the violation of private property rights,
namely patents, which would otherwise have been protected under the IPR laws of the
country that issued the patents.
Until the recent round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), IPR's
were not subject to formal international trade negotiation. Rather, lP were subject only to
international conventions such as the Rome and Paris Conventions concerning copyrights
and specifically patents. These conventions require "national treatment", which means
equal treatment to both foreigners and nationals. Conventions do not, however, require
the unification of rights granted by different countries. Accordingly, if a given nation
chooses to limit protection for its creators, then no greater protection is available to
foreigners.
Furthermore, a number of countries, including many former Soviet Bloc countries and
many Asian countries, have not yet or only recently signed international conventions.
They are therefore not bounded to protect rights of foreign firms. Weak: domestic laws
and refusal to sign international conventions has permitted piracy and copyright
infringement, particularly in Asia and the former Eastern Bloc.
The oldest of the multilateral international conventions is the International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, also known as the Paris Convention of 1883 (Auriol
& Pham, 1992: 15). This convention covers patents, industrial designs, trademarks, and
unfair competition. It requires "national treatment" (read "equal treatment") of the
intellectual property of foreign nationals. Inventors should also apply within a given time
frame for protection of their intellectual property in any signatory country of the
convention. The protection relates back to the registering date of the first application in
the home country. For patents, the registration provisions are important because without
them, an inventor could be barred from filing simply because she is a foreign national or
because she first registered her patent in another country.
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The GATT regulations as a part of the grander scheme of the WTO trade reform process
are the most important regulations determining the intellectual property regime. The
Uruguay round of 1986 was the birthplace of a new multilateral trade policy agenda that
expanded the scope of dimensions covered and also introduced the dispute resolution
mechanism (Sell, 2000: 174). Multilateral agreements on trade, for the first time,
incorporated policies on intellectual property and its accompanying rights. These
agreements culminated in TRIPS Agreement.
The TRIPS Agreement sets standards by requiring, first, that the substantive obligations
of the main conventions of the WIPO, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) in their most recent versions, must be
complied with. Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement adds a substantial number of additional
obligations on matters where the pre-existing conventions are silent or were seen as being
inadequate. The TRIPS Agreement is thus sometimes referred to as a Berne and Paris-
plus agreement
The TRIPS Agreement requires, in terms of patents, that Member countries make patents
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology
without discrimination, subject to the normal tests of novelty, inventiveness and industrial
applicability. It is also required that patents be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the place of invention and whether products are imported or
locally produced (Article 27.1). An important exception is enshrined in the Agreement
and entails that Member countries may exclude from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals (Article 27.3(a». This
exception facilitates the compulsory licensing and government use of pharmaceutical
patents without the authorization of the right holder. This is discussed in a later section.
TRIPS' inclusion within GATT is the outcome of relentless drive from powerful U.S.
private sector actors (Sell, 2000: 175). The role and importance of the US is discussed
later in this chapter. The US Government's transactional corporate affiliations and
connections can largely be attributed to TRIPS calls for the standardization of Pier's
among the signers. TRIPS diverts in two aspects from normal GATT regulations.
Firstly, TRIPS "orders" the signing countries to protect intellectual property rights pro-
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actively. TRIPS also applies "to the private rights of individual rights holders and not to
goods" (Reiter, 1994: 199-200).
An important economic implication of TRIPS is that less-developed countries do not have
the option of appropriating other industrialised countries' intellectual property to help
build their own economies .. Another implication is that the price of information and
technology is raised considerably as private sector actors strive to protect their monopoly-
like industries. Roderick (1994: 449) argues that the short-term impact of TRIPS will by
a large relocation of capital and resources from developing to industrialise countries.
2.2 Anglo-American IPR law tradition and the role of the US
Anglo-American law generally takes a pragmatic approach. IPR's are used to
commercialise inventions. IPR's are more instruments of commerce than of culture. An
important point in this tradition is that competitiveness should be primarily protected
rather than the inventor's rights. Although the US Patent Office has some of the most
stringent patent application procedures to ensure competitiveness, once granted it would
do anything in its power to protect the inventor (Aurio & Pham, 1992: 16). The political
strength of the interest groups, as we will see further in the paper, strongly influences the
willingness of the US government to extend and protect these patent laws.
Where the Anglo-American emphasises economic rights, developing countries emphasise
social or community rights. The distinction in views in terms ofIPR's are between
societies and countries "which see IPR's simply as part of a liberal market economy and
those which consider them to be an important factor in national development." (Auriol &
Pham, 1992: 18).
This distinction has led to the controversy between industrialised and developing
countries in the recent GATT negotiations in terms ofIPR's. One therefore finds that in
the preamble to the draft GATT treaty concerning TRIPS, community IPR's are excluded.
The TRIPS agreement explicitly states that IPR's are recognized only as private rights.
This excludes all kinds of knowledge, ideas and innovations produced in the traditional
environment such as villages among farmers, in forests among tribal peoples, and even in
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universities among intellectuals (Chartrand, 1995). By implication, South Africa's legal
challenge of the international law with regards to !PR's is a challenge of the legal regimes
of those state actors that benefit most from the current law regime.
The importance of the role of pharmaceutical firms in US policy issues can be traced to
the importance that the production of pharmaceutical industries holds for the US
economy. US exporting pharmaceutical firms rely heavily upon the production and
protection of intellectual property. These firms were growing increasingly more
frustrated with both legitimate competition and the increasing threat of piracy since the
1980s. Coupled with the growing trade deficit of the 1980s, the US policymakers felt that
US hegemony in the world's economy was under pressure (Kegley &Wittkopf, 1995).
US policymakers therefore pushed for strongly worded clauses on the protection of
intellectual property
The challenge to the international !PR regime by countries such as South Africa is thus a
challenge to US competitiveness in technological know-how. !PR's, and for that matter
patents, were already a trade issue during the mid-1980s. Post (1998: 5) argues that
piracy and intellectual property have, in fact, been linked since the beginning of trade.
Besides being related to the US's own growing trade deficit, there were the additional
strains on the large US economy as it was busy transforming from an industrial to a
service one, especially an information driven one. Technology production increased and
presented problems for US policy writers to manage, hence the considerable insistence on
protectionism in this regard.
Protectionism with regards to intellectual property is too a large extent driven by the
phenomenon of intellectual property piracy. Although not officially called piracy,
parallel imports are threats to the US sponsored !PR regime. International piracy of
intellectual property provided a convenient answer as to why the US was having
difficulties in the world market. Piracy also provided US firms with a visible enemy,
which could be fought, unlike the domestic and economic problems at the root of the
problem.
South Africa is not alone in its calls for distributive justice. Political pressure is mounting
through a fragmented and uncoordinated effort by developing countries. Before 1994, the
/
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TRIPS Agreement officially only recognized IPR's when they generate profit. The
Agreement made no legal provision for compulsory licensing and parallel import when
"essential" medicines need to be produced cheaply. The pressure from the WHO
officials and governments of developing countries, such as India and South Africa, that
had urgent national health needs, culminated into the inclusion of these clauses.
Until the Uruguay Round ofthe GATT, IPR's were not subject to formal international
trade negotiation. Rather, intellectual property was subject only to international
conventions such as the Berne and Rome Conventions concerning copyright. These
conventions require "national treatment", which means equal treatment to both foreigners
and nationals. The conventions do not, however, require the unification of rights granted
by different countries. Accordingly, if a given nation chooses to limit protection for its
innovators, then no greater protection can be available to foreigners. Furthermore, a
number of countries, including many former Soviet Bloc countries and many Asian
countries, have not yet or only recently signed international conventions. They are
therefore not bound to protect rights of foreign firms. Weak domestic laws and refusal to
sign international conventions has permitted piracy and copyright infringement,
particularly in Asia and the former Eastern Bloc.
South Africa is one of the developing countries that inherited its patent legislation from
its colonial ruler, namely the UK .. The UK introduced patent legislation to protect its
interests and especially those enterprises that enjoyed a monopoly on exports to the UK.
Now, South Africa is in the process of reforming its IPR legislation to try to address
public interests. As mentioned, it applied a clause of the TRIPS Agreement that allowed
for the compulsory licensing and parallel import of "essential" medicines such as anti-
retrovirals to curb HIV/Aids. The important actors within the international IPR regime
and notably the US and pharmaceutical industry, reacted strongly. Hence, South Africa,
as many other developing countries, is ''wary of - if not hostile to - any international
regime the standards of which would be uniformly applicable to all countries" (Auriol &
Pham, 1992: 16).
Therefore, the Anglo-American IPR law tradition is manifested in the system of
institutions such as the WIPO and the WTO, and foreign industrial and trade policy
mechanisms that collectively make out the international IPR regime.
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Against this backdrop of a US dominated drive for the protection ofIPR's and patents,
the international IPR regime became a hotly contested issue during the Uruguay round of
GATT. This is because the protection ofIPR's "is becoming increasingly closely linked
to the conditions of competition and international trade" (Auriol & Pham, 1992: 17).
History has shown that developing countries such as South Africa find IPR's too
expensive to maintain and to enforce. There is therefore little or no incentive to protect
them or to pay licensing fees accompanied by patent rights. This policy is known as "free
riding." The free riding economy is boosted by not having to pay the overhead costs of
creating a new product or of not having to pay for royalties associated with a respected
trademark.
The pharmaceutical industry by nature lends itself to be a "victim" of free riding.
Medicinal products are costly and risky to develop, yet relatively easy to copy.
Chartrand (1995) lists several IPR problems in developing countries, which are conducive
to free riding. For example, India recognizes no patents for drugs. Thailand and Brazil
also lacks proper protection for pharmaceuticals. Taiwan has extremely weak patent
protection for pharmaceuticals.
2.4 Compulsory licensing and parallel import
The two exceptions within TRIPS that the South African Government wanted to pursue
after the passage of its Medicines Act of 1997 were those of compulsory licensing and
parallel imports. Compulsory licences refer to the action when products are produced or
imported without the permission of the patent holder and when a government feels it
necessary to do so to address domestic issues. It is allowed under Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreements on the grounds determined by each Member country's "health-sensitive"
patent laws. In terms of the HIV/Aids and other national health emergencies, Article 31
makes provision for compulsory licensing when patent holders "refuse to deal" with the
Member country, or when "a national health emergency" should be addressed, or "anti-
competitive practices" such as excessive prices exist, or other instances where the "public
interest" is at stake (Correa, 2000: 114).
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Compulsory licensing can, according to TRIPS, also be executed through the parallel
import of "essential" medicines. The principle of parallel imports means that anyone can
freely import the legitimate copies of intellectual products, such as patents on medicines,
without seeking permission from the right holders beforehand (Correa, 2000: 120). The
right holders; especially US firms, argue that they should have the exclusive right of
importation to guarantee the quality and service on the goods as well as reasonable
pricing for each individual market. Hence, they have been demanding for the ban on
parallel import.
The issue of exhaustion of rights and parallel imports both involve the legitimate copies
made by the right holders or through their consent. The point is how far the right holders
should be allowed to hold the exclusive right of distribution of the goods. This question
is of relevance only when the principle of exhaustion involving patent and trademarks,
applies.
On their website, the WIPO (www.wipo.org, 2001) states that the there are three kinds of
practices concerning the exhaustion ofIPR's and the subsequent possibility of parallel
import. First, the "national exhaustion of rights" means that the right holders in any
particular country have the exclusive rights of distribution, which will be exhausted after
the first sale of such goods in that country.
Second, the "the regional exhaustion of rights" means that the right holders in any
regional economic community such as the European Union, have the exclusive right of
distribution which will be exhausted after the first sale in any member state. The
European Union has a well-established practice of intra-Community exhaustion and
extra-Community non-exhaustion.
The third kind is the "international exhaustion of rights" principle, which means that the
IPR holders will be deemed to have exhausted the exclusive right of distribution after the
first sale of their goods anywhere in the world. The last alternative does back up the idea
of global sourcing and global marketing as well as global pricing.
The debate gets more complicated when attention is paid to the public interest in terms of
choice of products. Ifit is in the public's interest not to buy legitimate goods, such as
34
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
anti-retrovirals, only from the right holders or their agents, then one can argue that the
international law principle of parallel import should remain. This argument can be used
when considering the plight of poor developing countries that need cheap medicines. In
the case of South Africa, the Health Department has violated some USA IPR laws when it
allowed generic medicines to be made at discount prices. The lawsuits are still going on.
The technological gap that exists hampers economic growth and eventually convergence
towards the richer industrialised countries. It is thus inevitable that we will see the
continuation of so-called "pirating" by developing countries. As long as the R&D costs
for new technology stays high, these countries will not have the incentive to produce it
themselves. The incentive to instate strong IPR laws and enforce them properly will be of
secondary importance to the political will to address developing countries' main
immediate problems of which cheap medicines for the curbing of the HIV/Aids is a
prominent example.
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CHAPTER THREE:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
3.1 The role of international organisations: WTO, WHO, WIPO and TRIPS
There is no doubt that the GATT regime was responsible for the unprecedented expansion
in international trade through the provision of concrete arrangements that reduced barriers
of trade and discriminatory policies (Young, 1992: 173). The liberal trade regime,
however, threatened the interests of many countries that were not reaping the full
benefits, such as the major economies of which the US is the leader. The rise of the
structuralist challenge in the 1970s and the institutionalisation of these countries' vision
in the New International Economic Order signalled growing dissatisfaction with the
liberal trade regime of the world. Together with protectionist challenges from the US as a
result of its huge trade deficits in the 1980s, it forced countries that were suffering from
developmental problems to question the prevailing order.
The growing dissent from mostly Southern countries was never really a threat for the
functioning of GATT, according to Young (1992: 174). The constant pressure from those
countries that had significant interests in a neo-liberal trade regime assured the
functioning of GATT. The US's growing protectionism towards IPR's should be seen as
efforts to protect the economic interests that the US had in the pharmaceutical industry
and its ability to function in a neo-liberalorder. The economic interest in pharmaceutical
firms was related to the substantial foreign exchange these firms were earning in the
1980s when the US was facing large trade deficits. The 1990s saw the US ease up on its
protectionist policies of the 1980s and coupled with numerous other factors, the US
economy continued to grow until the end of 1999.
However, two factors forced US policymakers to show signs of renewed protectionism in
terms ofIPR's. The first one is the fears of growth recession in the USA as prospects for
investment and consumption started to dwindle since the end of 1999. The second
challenge comes from private sector actors, especially pharmaceutical firms, who
expanded viciously during the 1990s by making use of the liberalisation of international
trade but now found their investments being threatened from growing welfare and
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redistributive challenges of developing countries. The pharmaceutical industry's
aggressive lobbying and pressure on US government officials illustrates this assertion.
These factors present significant challenges to the functioning of the GATT and WTO.
When evaluating the roles and effectiveness of international institutions and specifically
those of GATT and its follower, the WTO, Young (1992: 175-193) provides useful
criteria. They entail questions of transparency, robustness, power distribution,
transformation, government capacities, interdependence, and the extent of intellectual
influences.
Transparency entails the ability to monitor or to verify the policy implementations of the
WTO with regards to the main prescriptions and principles of its constitution, i.e. if it is
possible to see whether it does what it is supposed to do. Robustness refers to the
longevity of "social-choice" mechanisms enshrined within the policies, i.e. the ability of
WTO policy agreements to withstand the test of time and minor crises in world trade.
The criterion of power distribution refers to the degree of symmetry of material power
distribution between the members of the institution, i.e. whether there are sharp
differences in economic powers between the have and have not country members of the
WTO. Asymmetry hinders the working of an institution, as the powerless will feel ill
done by.
The criterion of transformation effectiveness involves the ability of the institution to
facilitate change and to restructure in response to world conditions according to its won
legislative procedures, i.e. whether the WTO can adapt consistently to changes in the
international trade system the way it should be. Finally, the criterion of government
capacity refers simply to the ability and capacity of member governments to implement
policy provisions. When evaluating the role of the WTO and GATT in the intellectual
property debacle regarding the violation of patent rights, one cannot help but to agree
with Young when he states after his analysis: "If I am right, institutional arrangements do
matter in international society ... " (1992: 193).
The Director-General of the WTO, Mike Moore welcomed the TRIPS Council's special
discussion, "Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines", that was initiated in June
2001, by concerned members, especially the African Group members of Africa. He
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acknowledged the importance of generic medicinal and parallel import issues for
developing countries that struggle with their health care programmes. He sees TRIPS,
not surprisingly, as a framework for sustainable economic development, not necessarily
an obstacle (WTO News, 2001). His optimism summarises many officials' stance
towards the WTO and TRIPS:
" (TRIPS) strikes a carefully-negotiated balance between providing intellectual
property protection - which is essential if new medicines and treatments are to be
developed - and allowing countries the flexibility to ensure that treatments reach the
world's poorest and most vulnerable people."
Moore outlines the ongoing tripartite commitments of the WTO, the WHO, and WIPO
towards the implementation of the TRIPS regulations. The commitments with the WHO
involve public health policy formulation, while those with the WIPO entails technical
assistance to developing countries to their health programmes and the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement by 2006.
Gor Bruntland, the Director-General of the WHO, states that he and his organisation are
committed to ensure reduced medicine prices for those countries that really need it.
The WHO is committed to partnering with commercial enterprises (Brundtland, 2000:1).
The working group of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (IFPMA) is a telling example of how international governmental organisation
is increasingly working with private sector actors. This working group is supposedly
helping developing countries with research and development. It is however not yet clear
how "dissident" countries, such as South Africa, India, and Brazil's unilateral violation of
WTO regulations, affect this relationship. Will the working group only provide
assistance to those countries that obey the regulations? Will it be possible to exclude other
developing countries from benefiting from R&D? These questions remain to be
answered.
Where Brundtland remains adamant on the WHO's commitments to IFPMA, he also
states that the agenda of the WHO is that of its member states. This is heading for a clash
of interests as he argues that patent protection is still a "very necessary and effective
incentive for research and development for needed new drugs". He acknowledges that
essential pharmaceutical medicines are not just commodities to be priced according to
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profit concerns and pleads for "equitable" pricing of essential medicines (Bruntland,
2000:2). It is obvious Bruntland is in favour of a negotiated settlement between private
and public sector interests, but it seems hard to reconcile this with his implicit argument
against protectionism from developing countries.
The WIPO is perceived to be sympathetic to developing countries' health and welfare
interests in a distributive international IPR regime. In 1995 the WIPO conducted a study
on financial and other implications of the implementation of the TRIPS agreement for
developing countries (The Financial Gazette, 15 March 2001). A report was released in
1996 and the observations and recommendations proved to be significant for the cause of
distributive justice in the international IPR regime. The report noted the historical role of
intellectual property in the world economy. The report argued that a too tight patenting
system would inflate the prices of protected products in highly patent-sensitive industries
such as the pharmaceutical industry. The report noted that the generic medicine debate in
terms of efforts to curb HIV/Aids is an issue of humanitarian intervention. Such an issue
should put be put ahead of issues concerning trade and investment that the TRIPS
agreement endeavoured to address.
3.2 The Pharmaceutical Industry
The role and influence of shifts in comparative advantage stands out as the most
important factor determining international trade in intellectual property (Smit &
McCarthy, 1998:66). Comparative advantage entails an advantage in terms of pricing,
marketing and sales of a manufactured product in a domestic market.
Comparative advantage is in tum determined by the extent of the technological gap that
exists between the foreign and domestic industries. A technological head start means that
a firm or industry is first to patent or license the manufactured intellectual property. The
technology gap is a function of cost considerations and the time to acquire the necessary
technology. Cost considerations for the development of intellectual property can largely
be related to R&D costs. The enormous financial outlay for R&D, as well as the uneven
accessibility of technology, explains why the rich industrialised countries and corporate
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actors in these countries hold the technological comparative advantage in the production
of intellectual property.
Pharmaceutical firms find themselves in a technology-intensive sector, which is an
environment of constant change, short product life cycles, and small market windows
(Bartlett & Goshal, 2000: 406). Pharmaceutical firms are also very dependent on each
other for R&D. Alliances in the industry are common as they are "risk-hedging" tools for
the pooling and leveraging of resources and capabilities (Boshal & Gartlett, 2000: 407).
In the knowledge-based economy, competitiveness means the ability to work smarter and
harder. Competitiveness means that firms will spend billions of dollars in response to
consumer demand for customised goods and services, higher quality, and more
applications. The pressure for competitiveness is responsible for fierce competition in
new and innovative designs. However, these designs can only be researched and
designed (R&D) after huge capital investments and time consuming labour.
Mossinghoff & Bombelles examined the pharmaceutical industry and argues that the
industry is highly sophisticated, research-intensive industry, and highly protected by
patents (1996: 38). The industry keeps its knowledge close at hand even after patents
have expired. The pharmaceutical firms are known to combine the ingredients of
obsolete medicines to form new medicines which they then patent again. This effectively
keeps the monopoly power in their hands.
The average cost of developing a new drug was $54 million in 1976. This has increased
to $87 million by 1982, and to $359 million in 1993 (Keegan, 1997: 19). Itwould be fair
to estimate that amount to be at least two to three times higher in 2001. In the $200
billion pharmaceutical industry seven countries account for 75 percent of sales (Keegan,
1997: 19). The US pharmaceutical industry is by far the largest and most powerful.
The concept of global competitiveness has introduced new concerns in terms of economic
transactions. The accelerating pace of technological displacement is bringing a whole
new dimension to international trade. It is especially in the area of trade in intellectual
property and patent rights that one is witnessing the problems of the dynamics of
comparative advantage and competitiveness. The accompanying problems of the
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protection ofIPR's and patents of the pharmaceutical industry create interesting
dilemmas. South Africa is now such a problem for the US pharmaceutical community.
The position of the pharmaceutical industry can be summarised by the statement by Mr.
Harvey Bale, the Director-General ofthe International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) in Geneva (Bale, 1999:1):
"If anyone wants to kill incentives for further research into a targeted
disease area (e.g., AIDS) then one of the quickest ways to do this is to
institute a compulsory licensing regime for drugs that treat that disease.
Compulsory licensing benefits nobody except the fortunate commercial
entity that is the beneficiary of the largesse offered by such licenses. In the
medium and long-term, it is patients who will lack new treatments for
serious diseases that suffer, as researchers will undoubtedly stay away
from targeted disease groups subject to CL policies. Compulsory licensing
seriously detracts from the purpose ofthe patent system, which as the 16th
President of the US, Abraham Lincoln said, 'provides the fuel for the fire
of genius. '"
Generally US pharmaceutical firms have a twenty-year patent protection. This protection
amounts to considerable monopoly-pricing power. The exception to the rule is when the
authorities have a large interest in the R&D of a specific medicine and would then
demand lower prices. The official position of the industry is however clear: no
protection of patent rights - no incentive for innovation and R&D for life-saving
medicines.
The pharmaceutical coalition showed their strength in the case of South Africa's
challenge of the IPR regime, by their consistent and comprehensive legal assault on the
Department of Health. Their case was based on the alleged violation of the 1978 Patents
Act. The case of protection of intellectual property was still undecided by the High
Court, even though the 1996 South African Constitution made the right to private
property prevalent in its Bill of Rights.
The pharmaceutical coalition secondly showed their strength in effectively lobbying US
politicians to react strongly with renewed calls for protection ofIPR's. This was despite a
specific WTO TRIPS regulation that allowed for parallel imports (Article 6), and
compulsory licensing (Article 31) (WTO News, 2001). The pharmaceutical coalition
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also managed to avoid questions on the use of compulsory licensing methods by the US,
Germany, and England.
South Africa's situation can be compared to the similar case of Bangladesh in the early
1980s. Not only was the government threatened with US foreign aid cuts, but also by the
pharmaceutical companies themselves who threatened to stop their sales of essential
medicines. Of all institutions, it was the World Bank that ordered the Bangladesh
government to reform their IPR laws in accordance with international IPR laws (Werner
& Sanders, 1997: 129-36).
Part of the strength of the pharmaceutical industry lies in its ability to maintain very good
public relations. Werner & Sanders (1997: 94) argues that the reason for this is the
enormous amounts that the industry spends on advertising, even more on average than on
the R&D for new medicines. Lobbying US politicians with "soft money" and campaign
contributions are part of the lavish advertising expenditure. Werner & Sanders (1997: 95)
calls the cosy relationship between US pharmaceutical firms and politicians the
"pharmaceuticalization of health care". It remains one of.the main structural features that
South Africa's challenge to the US IPR regime has exposed.
In trying to establish motivations for aggressive US political pressure as a reaction on
South Africa's IPR policies, it is useful to examine the connections between the private
and public sector in the US. The Centre for Responsive Politics is an NGO based in the
US, which, amongst other things, reports on material contributions from the private sector
to official institutions and individuals. According to a report ofthe CRP in 1999, major
pharmaceutical firms such as Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Glaxo Wellcome,
and Novartis, donated millions of dollars to US politicians (Baily, 1999: 1-5). According
to the report the 1997 to 1998 congressional elections mid-term elections saw a 53
percent increase in donations to the political parties and officials.
There is a large degree of interconnectedness of US political interests and the
pharmaceutical industry (Business Day, 20 July 1998). The Republican senator R. P.
Frelinghuysen of the state of New Jersey proposed the wording for a clause on foreign aid
that demanded that US aid to South Africa would be cut if the Government continued
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with the implementation of its Medicine Act. Incidentally, the pharmaceutical industry is
New Jersey's largest employer.
This business- to- public affiliation is an important point to digest in the light of South
Africa's leadership in making the international!PR regime more distributive by nature.
South Africa tested the waters; and US policy makers responded by making turning
threats to their vested interests in the !PR regime into counter-threats.
As a kind of compromise between developing countries' health interests and the
pharmaceutical industry's economic interest, UNAIDS introduced the concept of "tiered
pricing" or "equity pricing". This programme entails that different prices are charged for
essential medicines in industrialised and developing states. Pharmaceutical firms could
still stand a chance to make a reasonable profit. The demand for anti-retrovirals is
expected to increase dramatically so that pharmaceutical firms would earn sustainable
revenues from selling medicines even at near cost prices.
A compelling argument for pharmaceutical firms to agree to "equity pricing", is the threat
of drug-resistant strains ofHIV. Pharmaceutical firms could stand to lose their foothold
in markets if the medicines they manufacture are administered too late or incorrectly.
The resistant strains could even spread to higher-income markets and make expensive
anti-HIV medicines obsolete.
This argument was presented at last year's Aids Conference in Durban and illustrates a
dynamic process of bargaining, threats and counter-threats. One the one hand the South
African Government challenged the international !PR regime with its moves to apply
parallel import and generic manufacturing. On the other hand, they try to convince
pharmaceutical firms to lower the price of medicines. It is true that many of the better
known anti-retrovirals such as AZT, are already trading at much cheaper prices. Glaxo
Wellcome, a well-known international pharmaceutical firm, already felt the political and
legal pressure and agreed, in conjunction with UNAIDS, to investments in anti-Aids
programmes and technical support of aids advocacy groups (Mukherjee, 2000: 3).
Another stance of the pharmaceutical industry was summarised by two reports in 2001.
The first one by was by Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White, titled "Do Patents for
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Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa." The second one
was a PhRMA survey titled "Facts and Figures on Patenting and Access in Africa" and
presented by Tom Bombelles at the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
(ASLME) conference on Law and Human Rights (CPTECH, 16 October 2001).
Both reports questioned thevalidity of arguments in favour of an !PR regime that
condoned the violation of pharmaceutical patent rights. These reports argued that patents
are not important barriers to the treatment ofHIV/Aids in Africa. Access to anti-
retroviral medicines, if freely and cheaply available, will not make up for the deficiencies
in the capacities of African governments, such as South Africa, to deliver in terms of
public spending on health care.
The pharmaceutical industry's strong lobbying and economic pressure on the South
African Government for the protection of their patent rights is better understood when
one examines their economic interests in the South African market. South Africa's huge
GDP in comparison with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (almost 40%) and its on average
R2S 000 per capita annual income means substantial buying power (CPTECH, 16
October 2001). The health care system boasts above-average infrastructure by African
standards, which means that the administering of anti-retrovirals can be done without too
much difficulty. Finally, coupled with the estimated four to five million HIV+ persons in
the country, it is easy to understand why the South African market is "lucrative" for
pharmaceutical manufacturers of anti-retrovirals and other anti-HIV/Aids medicines.
The decision of the South African Department of Health to import cheap medicines for
the fighting ofHIV/Aids, unleashed unprecedented pressure from the US pharmaceutical
industrial community. The coalition of the transnational pharmaceutical firms threatened
the Government that they would withdraw their investments from the country. The
pharmaceutical industry had a powerful ally in the form of the then Vice-President of the
US, Al Gore. Gore had two important motivations for his hard-line approach towards the
South African Government. Firstly, he defended US interests in that its firms should not
lose market power. Secondly, Gore's coalition enjoyed considerable "soft money"
contributions, i.e. mostly campaign contributions.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
AIDS: THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION
4.1 Introduction
The structural inequality that defines South Africa is largely unchanged. It appears to
have been reinforced by economic (especially macroeconomic) policies that exclude the
majority from the circles in which power and opportunity circulate. While the richest 20%
bracket of income-earners was modestly de-racialised in the 1990s, the poorest 40%
remain overwhelmingly African and female (Marais, 2000: 2). The country's rate of
poverty (a measurement of the extent of absolute poverty) is 45%, which translates into
just over 3 million households living below the poverty line. The situation will probably
remain relatively unchanged for the next four years.
The low quality education and poor health situation further enforces the above-mentioned
factors and are by large the main reasons for the widespread occurrence of Aids. The
demographical dimension of Aids in South Africa is shocking; in 1999, South Africa was
home to the world's fastest-growing HIV infection rates. One in five adults are infected
with HIV (Time, 24 July 2000). Studies have reported that at least 16% of the adult
population, 20% of pregnant women and 45% of the armed forces are HIV-positive
(Department of Health, 2000). The black population group in general has the highest risk
to contract HIV due to their socio-economic position. Additionally, between six and ten
million South Africans are likely to die of AIDS in the next 10 to 15 years, out of a
current population of forty million. By 2010, there could be two million Aids orphans in
South Africa (The Economist, 27 May 2000).
The macroeconomic impact of AIDS is also serious. South Africa's already painful
shortage of skills will grow worse. As the government divert their savings to pay for
health care, the amount of domestic funds available for investment will ebb. These are
but a few facts that surfaced at the Aids Conference that was held in Durban, South
Africa, during July 2000 (Mukherjee, 2000:1). This conference provided the facilitation
of different discourses surrounding the Aids epidemic. The conference was somewhat
disappointing in the light of the Government's stance towards Aids and its position on the
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implementation of its proposed Medicines Act was unclear.
The defensive political style adopted by President Mbeki on issues such as the Aids
epidemic amounted to much criticism of the South African Government's agenda
(Financial Mail, 18 December 1998). Fortunately, power is consolidated within a
democratically elected parliament where the ruling ANC party enjoys high support levels.
This inspires confidence that the government is strong and decisive as a whole.
Patrick Bond (1999), an active and influential Aids-campaign activist, criticises President
Mbeki's perceived inability to strengthen confidence levels in the Government's policies
on HIV/Aids. President Mbeki is now renowned for his efforts to shift attention from
South Africa's ineffective HIV -AIDS policies. His stance was that the Government could
not blame all the problems on just AIDSIHIV. He continuously stressed the importance
of poverty as the major underlying cause of disability, starvation, reduced life expectancy,
mental illness, and other symptoms of an impoverished society. He implicitly denied a
link between HIV and AIDS and was backed by the board of researchers that the Health
Department appointed.
One can argue that the Mbeki-administration predicted in advance that even cheap
generic medicines would not be cheap enough and that the Government's health and
welfare budgets would be pressured to administer and provide these medicines. Dr Costa
Gazi, health secretary of the Pan-Africanist Congress and formerly the head of public
health at Cecilia Makiwane Hospital, was one of the intellectuals whom argued for the
introduction ofa national prevention scheme of mother- child transmission ofHIV (Bond,
2000: 4). The reason was that his research indicated that that the treatment ofHIV+
children for Aids-related ailments would cost the state enormous amounts for it to be
effective. His research indicated that anti-retroviral injections for the estimated 70 000
HIV+ expectant mothers would cost the state R90 million annually. This scheme could
save lives and money. However, one doubts whether the South African healthcare system
actually has the capacity to care for sick HIV+ patients and especially the infants.
Nicoli Natrass, an economist from the University of Cape Town, highlights the problems
that could arise if the Government does not go ahead with its scheme to prevent mother to
child transmission ofHIV (Daily Mail & Guardian, 16 July 2001). According to her, the
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intended use of anti-retrovirals could save the Government more than R850 million a year
- the cost of caring for HIV/Aids orphans.
At an international Aids conference during 2001 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a South
African medical research team from the University of Witwatersrand showed
conclusively that anti-retrovirals could be successfully administered to people "in
resource-poor settings" (Daily Mail & Guardian, 16 July 2001). The evidence was
collected from 16 clinical trials involving almost 800 HIV-positive people. Anti-
retrovirals should however be cheap enough in the first place. The efforts to attain this
goal are the single biggest motivation for government action.
What are the advantages of cheaper medicines? According to Zwile Mkhize, the
KwaZulu Natal provincial minister of health, administering anti-retroviral medicines to
South Africa's 4,2 million HIV+ residents would amount to almost R90 billion per year
(Bond, 1999: 5). This would be the case if it were done under the present
pharmaceutical-pricing constraints, i.e. without the benefit of parallel imports. This
amount compares bleakly against the national budget of less that R300 billion and an
official budget for HIV prevention of less than R200 million. If one compares this, for
interest's sake, to the R900 million earned by a Chief Executive Officer of a certain
pharmaceutical firm (Bond, 1999:1), one realise how dire the situation is.
A recent effort by the South African and Botswana governments was the initiation of the
world's largest Internet-based HIV treatment and care programme (Daily Mail &
Guardian, 16 July 2001). This programme aims to drastically reduce the costs of
HIV/Aids treatment by facilitating the sharing of information on patient diagnostics,
treatment and general care ofHIV /Aids victims. This project could help to bring the
treatment costs down to as little as R8 per person per month. The data collected through
this programme would be used to advise pharmaceutical manufacturers, epidemiologists,
doctors, and patients. Interestingly, the programme was designed in the US and it
provided for generic medicines being used in the treatments.
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4.2 The 1997 Medicines Act
Addressing the HIV/Aids situation is of the utmost importance for the South African
Government. The Government is motivated by the economic losses the country would
suffer if Aids takes its projected toll. Prevention is seen to be much cheaper than
treatment, but the current statistics indicate that the immediate problem is that of
treatment of Aids victims. The externalities ofan active anti-HIV/Aids treatment
campaign amount to safe and healthy environments that will be conducive to economic
growth. The Government thus has a large responsibility in initiating legislation that
facilitates the most efficient anti-HIV/Aids treatment programme. Coupled with the
Government's obligation to provide adequate health care as a fundamental human right,
the legislation is aimed at curbing the Aids epidemic of the current generation, but also to
facilitate sustainable treatment and prevention of Aids. These arguments presented the
main motivations for the passing of the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act ("Medicines Act") in 1997 by then Minister of Health, Dr. Zuma. (RSA,
1997: 6-7)
The ANC promised during the 1994 election campaign that the elected government would
provide essential medicines for the treatment of various conditions at discount prices.
After the election, this promise culminated into the Essential Drugs List (EDL),
established in 1996 by the Government. The Department of Health pledged that the
"EDL medicines will be available at all district hospitals, public providers and accredited
private providers" (Department of Health, 1996: 35).
The increased health care budget since 1994 provided for a substantial increase in the
contribution of clinics especially in rural areas. At a rate of four per week, this cost the
Department of Health roughly R400 million per year (Department of Health, 1997: 8).
The Government was thus also under the obligation to provide the necessary medicines to
care for the increasing number ofHIV/Aids patients that were streaming to these clinics.
South Africa's violation of US !PR and WTO laws officially began with the passing of
the 1997 Medicines Act. This law condoned parallel imports and the production of
generic medicines, especially anti-retrovirals for AIDSIHIV, within South Africa. The
law ordered the Department of Health to override the TRIPS regulations of the WTO
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agreement with South Africa. The provision was, however, only for the violation of
patents in cases of extreme emergencies, such as the curbing of the HIV/Aids epidemic.
The rationale behind the parallel importation of generic medicines is the enormous price
advantage: in theory, generic medicines could be imported from markets such as India
and Brazil at 5% of the original product's cost.
India was a source for such imports because of the availability of generic medicines.
Multinaltional pharmaceutical firms were charging anything from R80 000 to R120 000
per year per patient for their patented anti-Aids combination medicines. In India, the
generic producer Cipla, only charged between R1000 to R2500 per year per patient for
the generic versions (Maine, 2000).
AZT, ddl and ddC are some of the more well-known anti-retrovirals. These were
developed in the US. AZT is a "universally" targeting anti-retroviral medicine and is the
cheapest and easiest to manufacture. AZT is currently made by the pharmaceutical firm
Glaxo- Wellcome, and costs about R22 000 per year per patient in South Africa. The
generic version could however be purchased in India for just R4 500 per year per patient
(Bond, 1999: 3). Even if the so-called "equity pricing" was applied in South Africa, the
incentive would have been there in any case to opt for the generic version due to the huge
price savings.
Parallel imports are a direct threat to those pharmaceutical firms that have vested interests
in South Africa, or those who wants to invest. Up till now, a few pharmaceutical firms
have enjoyed almost full monopoly market power. Not surprisingly, the major
transnational pharmaceutical firms immediately objected to the Medicines Act. These
interest groups took the South African Government to court under the umbrella of the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Associations (IFPMA).
Worldwide support for the South African Government's!PR policies was increasing at
the same time. Developing countries particularly were very vocal in their criticism of the
US for interfering and putting pressure on South Africa. The US and especially former
Vice-President had to deal with increasing international political pressure. It culminated
in Gore's concession to President Mbeki at a meeting between them in September 1999
that the South African Medicines act had some merit. Then President Clinton officially
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agreed at the Seattle WTO summit of 1999 that his administration would not bargain for
the stricter enforcement of TRIPS to protect US pharmaceutical firms (Bond, 2000: 9).
At this point, the South African Government made an error in its health policy: instead of
taking advantage of the US concession, the Mbeki-administration sidestepped the
implementation of decisive anti-AIDS programmes. It subsequently did not pursue either
the generic medicine production programme or parallel imports of these medicines.
In countries where alternative or generic medicines are available, the price of a branded
product usually falls as a result of the competition it faces from low-priced alternatives.
When the Brazilian government began producing AIDS drugs generically, for example,
the prices of equivalent branded products dropped by 79 per cent. The same brand is sold
at a higher price in countries where there is no competition from generic producers.
4.3 The Government and the TRIPS Agreement
During June 2000, the WTO TRIPS Council held a special discussion on patents and
access to medicines. This was after a plea from the Africa Group to address important
issues that arose out of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement. The Africa Group, consisting of
most of the member countries of Africa including South Africa, proposed a decisive plan
to reduce the high prices of patented medicines. The proposal was strongly supported by a
host of sympathetic NGO's and culminated into a separate plea from them as presented
by the prominent NGO, OXFAM (Maine, 2000: 2). The Africa Group's proposal was
motivated by concerns over the major socio-economic impact that the HIV/Aids epidemic
could have on most of the developing world. The Africa Group was specifically annoyed
with the pharmaceutical industries for their monopoly-like behaviour in the blocking of
competition from other lower-cost generic producers.
Before the advent of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement, member countries were allowed more
exception clauses on the protection of patents by their national patent laws. Many
countries (almost fifty) did not have laws for the protection of patent rights of
pharmaceutical products (Maine, 2000: 3). The TRIPS agreement now puts developing
countries in a position where they cannot legally challenge the pharmaceutical industry's
monopoly on essential medicines.
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However, there is a clause that empowers countries, in theory at least, to import or
produce essential medicines when national health interests require it. This clause refers to
the principle of compulsory licensing and parallel importation, which was discussed
earlier on.
Although legal experts on the TRIPS Agreement have foreseen that the existing
provisions on compulsory licensing and parallel importation can be exploited (Maine,
2000: 4), countries willing to utilise such clauses in the international IPR regime were put
under considerable pressure. Brazil had been taken to court within the WTO legal
framework for its production of generic medicines. South Africa, actually the
Department of Health, had been taken to South Africa's own High Court by a coalition of
multinational pharmaceutical firms for its decision to make use of parallel imports.
Clause 15(c) of the 1997 Medicines Act is the most controversial one. It provides that
South Africa must seek the lowest world price for a medicine by implementing the
principle of "parallel importing" (RSA, 1997). The Government is also allowed to
implement "compulsory drugs licensing". The pressure first came form the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a coalition of US
based firms. This did not succeed in convincing the Government to scrap the law.
Subsequently, the coalition of 40 South African and international pharmaceutical firms
took the matter to the High Court.
After about a year of intense legal haggling, threats, diplomacy and negotiations, the
Pretoria High Court ruled against the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association in
favour of the Department of Health on the 19th of April2001 (Die Burger, 20 April
2001). Consequently, the much debated medicinal legislation can now be implemented.
The Government pledged that it would consult the pharmaceutical industry in its
decisions and that it would not use the controversial article 15(c) to sidestep patent rights.
The ruling is only a moral victory, as the Government lacks the money and infrastructure
to provide cheaper anti-retroviral generic medicines soon. However, the ruling does set a
precedent for the Department of Health's continued efforts to address important health
issues by challenging the US pharmaceutical industry's IPR interests.
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Danny Schecter, a US television producer and independent filmmaker, also criticises the
behaviour of the ANC-led government (2001: 1-7). His article proposes that the ongoing
debacle on parallel imports of generic medicines is a political plot by the Government to
enable a radical reduction in the prices of "essential" medicines such as anti-retrovirals.
He also implies that this strategy of the Government is deliberately benefiting domestic
pharmaceutical firms in which the Government has considerable economic interests.
Nevertheless, there does not exist official evidence for this allegation. Pharmaceutical
firms, and for that matter US government officials, well versed in the game of bargaining
and bluffing, do practice such tactics during negotiations. If it turns out that South Africa
is conducting such a strategy, the impact for the international !PR regime will be tragic,
as it will discredit developing countries.
52
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Has South Africa's challenge of the WTO TRIPS agreement on the principles of parallel
import and compulsory licensing brought about significant impacts on the international
!PR regime? The answer symbolises a new trend that can be analysed using Biersteker's
approach.
In terms of a systemic analysis, the case study offered a prime example of how the
present economic order exacerbates developing countries' lack of access to and capacity
of technological stock, welfare systems, and bargaining power in the international
political economy.
Domestic interests, whether state-led or pushed by civil society, have led to considerable
pressure on South Africa's government to implement drastic measures. As the
government responded with health system reforms, its actions damaged the interests of
the US and US pharmaceutical firms. These processes led simultaneously to the
formation of new coalitions, for example the pressure groups that civil society formed in
response to US political pressure, and also the consolidation of established coalitions, for
example the coalition between US politicians and US pharmaceutical firms.
In terms of ideas and ideology, the case study examined contains a mixture of all the
more important ideologies. The clash between the marginalized South and the integrated
North is (again) present, reflecting the gap between the haves and have-nots.
In terms of an institutional analysis, the case study illustrated how the international
institutions facilitate the neo-liberal trade agenda ofthe world's production and trade
hegemon, namely the US. These institutions can however be used for the benefit of those
countries that are not fully benefiting from such an order, as South Africa has shown.
A view that was prevalent in the discussion was that South Africa, and developing
countries for that matter, regard essential medicines as a fundamental human right. This
has substantial implications for the policy measures that developing countries with health
system problems will adopt. The global goods approach provides a useful analytical
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framework for the ideational underpinnings for such a view. This approach explains
developing countries' pressure for a distributive !PR regime.
Another prevalent view is that the implementation deadlines within the TRIPS agreement
for medicines in terms of adopting WTO standards for !PR's, were not found to be either
enforceable or equitable, hence the option to exploit the compulsory licensing and parallel
importation.
The private sector pressure on the South African government was significant. If it can be
shown that differential pricing of medicines is a concession by the pharmaceutical firms,
governments will continue to exploit the clauses in TRIPS with the hope of further
concessions. This haggling over price and legalities may continue indefinitely and reduce
the effectiveness of the WTO and the !PR regime in general.
South Africa's challenge of the international!PR regime can have important implications
for how potential investors other than pharmaceutical industries see the legal regime in
the country. These firms will only be willing to invest and to transfer technology in
circumstances in which the legal, economic, political, and social environment are such
that !PR's are guaranteed. Even ifit is a well known fact that the government wants to
exploit WTO regulations to address important health issues, the perception will be that
South Africa is a rogue state unable to comply with international !PR laws regarding
pharmaceutical patents.
It is significant to note the enormous bilateral political pressure from the US. Clearly
South Africa was taking the international leadership in !PR's relating to important South
issues, namely health and distribution of wealth. This put the world hegemon under
pressure to react and defend the interests of its own firms. The challenge that South
Africa posed to US pharmaceutical firms was a reaction to counter-threats such as the
withholding of US aid and punitive sanctions against South African exporters.
The international !PR regime is therefore not only the playfield of intellectual property,
patents, health issues, trade regulations, and private sector firms. The political economy
of the !PR regime is si~ificantly more complex and illustrates the most important
dilemmas of the current international political economy. As Mr. Ian Roberts, special
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advisor to former Health Minister, Dr. Zuma, put it after the WHO passed a revised drug
strategy in 1999 in response to pressure from South Africa and other developing
countries:
" The main importance ofthis resolution is that health now has a role in all international
trade and finance agreements" (Financial Times, 29 March 1999)
Finally, through the international leadership of South Africa in its challenge of the
international IPR regime, developing countries have been shown how to effectively use
international institutions in a democratic way to address their developmental problems.
Through the global governance system of multilateral negotiations, South Africa has
found ways to counteract the powerful forces of the private sector through legal
bargaining within the WTO TRIPS regime.
South Africa has challenged a "tight" IPR protectionist regime. One consequence of a
too tight IPR regime amounts to uneven distributions of essential intellectual property
stock between developed and less developed countries. Another consequence is
inefficient production of intellectual property, which inevitably affects health and living
standards in less developed countries (Stiglitz, 1999: 315). The precedent set for other
less developed countries is that they can challenge the US IPR law regime as long as it is
done under the auspices of international organisations and international law agreements.
In terms of recommendations for future policies, it is first and foremost important that
South Africa draws up a comprehensive, clear-cut, and decisive strategy in terms of its
current and planned IPR policy considerations. Uncertainty and "grey" areas in the
Constitution do not contribute to meaningful bilateral and multilateral discussions on the
issue of patent rights and intellectual property in particular. The state departments that
negotiate on such issues should have a clear mandate during discussions on IPR related
issues, whether they are participating in the WHO, WTO, WIPO, or in bilateral
discussions with US government officials and US pharmaceutical firms.
A clear cut stance will make negotiations easier, but it will also indicate a base point from
where the Government and civil society of South Africa are willing to negotiate. This is
essential for the maintenance of the important leadership role that South Africa has
assumed within the South. Such a recommendation presupposes, however, that the
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political leadership has to have the will and stamina to promote the cause of distributive
justice.
In dealing with the US government, the South African Government will have to keep in
mind the powerful private interests that influences politicians in the US. Although the
private and public sectors are two separate spheres, the interdependencies necessitate a
holistic approach.
The structural tendency for the protection of US interests is an important factor to keep in
mind. In dealing with the US, South African policymakers will have remember that as
US interests feel threatened, they will be extremely defensive in their trade and industrial
foreign policies.
Inorder to bypass certain inefficiencies that may occur when the IPR regime is used to
protect intellectual property, alternative methods can be used. There are also alternatives
for certain intellectual property products when the legal and political environment in the
foreign country makes licensing too risky. Gikkas (1996) lists five primary alternatives to
a licensing agreement from pharmaceutical firms. For the pharmaceutical firm, this means
making a direct foreign investment, selling a turnkey package, participating in a joint
venture, selling equipment or investing in existing capital in the foreign country. These
alternatives may prove to be of use in the near future when developing countries are still
consolidating their IPR law regimes and the judicial systems. After they are consolidated,
conventional licensing agreements can again be used to secure the rights on imported
intellectual property.
Stiglitz (1999: 312) also suggests a strategy of how governments can deal with the under-
production of pharmaceutical medicines without violating IPR's. This involves that
governments should support their health programmes directly. This strategy presupposes
that the South African Government should raise substantial revenues without large costs,
whether through aid donor programmes or private sector support. The Government then
would have to "effectively discriminate between good and bad research projects"
(Stiglitz, 1999: 312). In South Africa, this strategy was followed half-heartedly but due
to the enormous resources that are needed to curb the HIV IAids epidemic, the
government was forced to manipulating its IPR laws in order to secure cheap medicines.
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Stiglitz (1999: 316) suggests that governments, once in the position to bargain with the
pharmaceutical industrial establishment, could negotiate for a cut of the return on
innovations of pharmaceutical firms. This cut, whether in the form of infrastructural or
fmancial support, could help to "replenish the global knowledge commons" in terms of
the technology fight againstHIV/Aids. South Africa could take this next step to
challenge the international industrial establishment (incidentally also dominated by the
US economy) by arguing for these "welfare taxes". The criteria would however have to
be clear: only those activities relating to the production of anti-HIV/Aids medicines
should be applicable. A prerequisite would have to be that the Government finalises its
!PR laws to foster investor confidence and certainty on policy directions.
This thesis implicitly raised questions on whether the current international !PR regime is
representative of a world with conflicting interests in economic efficiency and equity.
The conclusion is that the regime is dominated by US economic interests and not by a
distributive and equitable agenda. In challenging and criticising the regime, South Africa
should be careful not to take advantage and enhance its own self-interest in the global
knowledge commons. lts leadership role means substantial responsibility in ensuring an
equitable and yet efficient international IPR regime for all nations.
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